Hier war die Rede von Nibbana, was so bezeichnet wird: "Es kann nicht aufgefunden" werden. Zumindest hatte ich den Eindruck, dass so begründet wurde.
Zitat Chapter XI - The Ten Comparisons
Text of the sūtra commented upon in this chapter (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 4–5; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 5).
(19) Māyāmarīcidakacandrākāśapratiśrutkāgandharvanagarasvapnachāyāpatibimba-nirmāṇopamadharmādhimukatair (20)asaṅgavaiśāradyapratilabdhaiḥ (21) sattvacittacaritajñaiḥ sūkṣmajñānāvatārakuṣalaiḥ.
These bodhisattvas accept that dharmas are like a magic show, a mirage, the moon reflected in water, space, an echo, a city of the gandharvas, a dream, a shadow, a reflection in a mirror, a metamorphosis. They have acquired the unhindered fearlessnesses. Knowing the process of mind and the behavior of beings, they are skilled in saving them by means of their subtle wisdom.
19. THE TEN UPAMĀNAS
[101c] Sūtra: These bodhisattvas accept that dharmas are like 1) a magic show, 2) a mirage, 3) the moon reflected in water, 4) space, 5) an echo, 6) a city of the gandharvas, 7) a dream, a shadow, 9) a reflection in a mirror, 10) a creation (māyāmarīcidakacandrākāśapratiśrutkā-gandharvasvapnachāyapratibimbanirmāṇopamadharmādhimuktaiḥ).
1. Like a magic show (māyā)
Śāstra: These ten comparisons serve to explain empty dharmas (śūnyadharma).
Question. – If all dharmas are empty (śūnya) like a magic show (māyā), why are they seen (dṛṣṭa), heard (śruta), felt (ghrāta), tasted (āsvadita), touched (spṛṣṭa) and known (vijñāta)? If they truly did not exist, how could one see them … and know them? – Furthermore, if they are seen out of error although they do not exist, why do we not see sounds (śabda) and hear colors (rūpa)? – If all dharmas are equally empty (śūnya) and non-existent (asat), why are some of them visible (sanidarśana) and others invisible (anidarśana)? Being empty, dharmas are like a finger (aṅguli) of which the first nail (nakha) is non-existent and likewise the second. Why is it that we do not see the second nail and we see only the first? Therefore we know that the first nail, which really exists, is visible, whereas the second, which does not really exist, is invisible.
Answer. – Although the nature of dharmas (dharmalakṣaṇa) is empty, we can distinguish visible dharmas (sanidarśana) and invisible dharmas (anidarśana). Take, for example, magical elephants (hastin) and horses (aśva) and other things of this kind: we know very well that they are not real and yet we see their color, we hear their sounds; they correspond to the six sense-objects and they are not mixed up one with the other. In the same way, although dharmas are empty, we can see them, we can hear them, and they are not confused one with the other.
Thus, in the Tö niu king (Therīsūtra) the therī asks the Buddha: “O Bhagavat, is [102a] ignorance (avidyā) internal (ādhyātmika)?”
“No.”
“Is it external (bahirdhā)?”
“No.”
“Is it both internal and external?”
“No.”
“O Bhagavat, does this ignorance come from the previous lifetime (pūrvajanma)?”
“No.”
“Does it come from the present lifetime (ihajanma) and does it pass to the next one (punarjanma)?”
“No.”
“Does this ignorance have an arising (utpāda) and a cessation (nirodha)?”
“No.”
“Is there a truly existent dharma that could be called ignorance?”
“No.”
Then the therī said to the Buddha: “If ignorance is not internal, not external, neither internal nor external, if it does not pass from the previous lifetime to the present lifetime and from the present lifetime to the following lifetime, if it does not have a true nature, how can ignorance be the condition (pratyaya) for the formations (saṃskāra) and so on [for the twelve members of [pratītyasamutpāda] up to this accumulation of this mass of suffering (duḥkhaskandhasyotpādaḥ)? O Bhagavat, it is as if a tree has no root (mūla): how could it produce a trunk (skandha), knots (granthi), branches (śākhā), leaves (dala), flowers (puṣpa) and fruit (phala)?”
The Buddha replied: “The nature of dharmas is emptiness (śūnya). However, worldly people (pṛthagjana), ignorant (aśrutavat) and without knowledge (ajñānavat), produce all kinds of afflictions (kleśa) in regard to dharmas, [of which the main one is ignorance]. This affliction is the cause and condition (pratyaya) for actions of body, speech and mind (kāyavāgmanaskarman) which are the cause of a new existence (punarjanma). As a result of this existence we experience suffering (duḥkha) or pleasure (sukha). Thus, if the affliction (i.e., ignorance) did not truly exist, there would be no actions of body, speech and mind, and we would not experience suffering or pleasure. When a magician (māyākāra) creates all kinds of objects by magic, are these magical products internal (ādhyātmika) according to you?”
“No.”
“Are they external?”
“No.”
“Are they both internal and external?”
“No.”
“Do they pass from the previous lifetime to the present lifetime and from the present lifetime to the next lifetime?”
“No.”
“Do the products of magic have a birth (utpāda) and a cessation (nirodha)?”
“No.”
“Is there really a dharma that is the product of magic?”
“No.”
Then the Buddha said:
“Do you not see, do you not hear, the musical instruments (vādya, tūrya) produced by magic?”
“Yes, I see them and I hear them.”
“Then”, continued the Buddha, “if the magic show is empty (śūnya), deceptive (vañcaka) and without reality, how can one get musical instruments by magic?
“Bhagavat, although the magic show has no basis, one can hear it and see it.”
“Well,” said the Buddha, “it is the same for ignorance. It is not internal, it is not external, it is not both, neither is it neither internal nor external. It does not pass from the past lifetime to the present lifetime nor from the present lifetime to the next lifetime; it has no true nature, it has neither birth nor cessation. However, ignorance (avidyā) is the cause and condition (hetupratyaya) for the formations (saṃskāra) and so on up to the accumulation of this mass of suffering (duḥkha-skandhasyotpādaḥ). When the magic show is over, the products of magic vanish. In the same way, when ignorance is destroyed (kṣīṇa), the formations also are destroyed and so on [for the twelve members of pratītyasamutpāda] up to the complete disappearance of the mass of suffering.”
Ich muss mich korrigieren, ich glaubte da etwas wiedergegeben zu haben, was hier stehen soll. Es war eigentlich ziemlich wichtig für mich das hier noch ein paar Male jetzt gelesen zu haben ...
Nichtsdestotrotz, übertragen auf alle Dinge (und nicht "nur" die eigene Wahrnehmung und damit die durch das NichtWissen bedingten Gestaltungen) habe ich das Gefühl, dass man NichtWissen als etwas Qualitatives (es ist das Rote, es ist das Blaue, es ist das Feste, es ist das Weiche) eigentlich nicht bezeichnen kann. Es ist nicht direkt sichtbar wie ein Auto sichtbar ist zB. Aber ohne NichtWissen kein zusammengesetztes Ding Auto und auch keine Wahrnehmung von "Auto" lediglich als "Auto".
Mir ist klar, dass ein Übertragungsfehler entsteht, wenn man so auf die philosophische, allumfassende Ebene wechseln will. Es ändert sich damit ja auch die Bedeutung des Begriffs Samsara, wenn man sich selbst aus der Aussage herauskürzt. Weswegen man diesen Denk"fehler" konsequent mit durchziehen müsste. Ich glaube, wenn man die Bewegung/das Wandern aus der Aussage "Samsara" kürzt, um zu einer philosophischen Sicht zu kommen, lässt sich die bedingte Bewegung durch ein echtes Ding "NichtWissen" anzeigen, was man direkt zwar nicht erkennen kann, was sich aber grob und fein durch ein so gedachtes abgeschlossenes aber sich ineinander unendlich "verknäulendes" Samsara (was man ohne sich selbst, also ohne den Wanderer denkt, also: von aussen stehend betrachtend) eigentatürlich und in Kombination mit dem Gesetz der bedingten Entstehung hindurchwirkt. Was ja ein Vorgang ist.
Philosophisch komplett Samsara gedacht sieht es für mich eher so aus, dass ein "objektives" eigentlich nicht vorhandenes, und nur für den Denkakt so gesetztes NichtWissen Samsara durchwirkt und damit mit ihn verbunden ist. Und dass so gedacht eher zwischen Samsara und NichtWissen kein Unterschied zu finden ist.